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Anyone familiar with American pop culture over the past sixty years or so would 
recognize the origins of the main title for this paper. A Broadway musical with that title 
opened in 1962, and its success was followed by a film version released in 1966 and 
(over the decades) many theatrical productions staged in London (1963 and 2004) and 
just about every theatrical venue one can imagine from secondary schools and colleges 
to numerous traveling companies and two Broadway revivals (1972 and 1996). It is 
perhaps most memorable for its opening number, "Comedy Tonight!", which included 
lyrics intended to describe the nature of the play in a series of descriptors as "frenetic", 
"erratic", "dramatic", "frenzy and frolic", "gaudy" and "bawdy."  In the familiar lines at 
the top of the song (and twice repeated), the show promised "something familiar, 
something peculiar, something for everyone: comedy tonight!"1 
 
For scholars engaged in the study accountability, the relevance of the title might 
seem as merely a "play on words" given the increasingly central role of "accountability 
forums" in both our theoretical and empirical work. Among the many alternative 
models and metaphors applied in accountability studies over the past three decades, 
few have taken hold like that of the "accountability forum". This important perspective 
on accountability has proven very useful, but as we attempt to show in this paper, it has 
also acted as a distraction -- diverting attention from other forms of significant 
accountability-relationships that have yet to get the attention they deserve. 
 
And it is in that regard that some of the details of the theatrical presentation of "A 
Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum" can prove metaphorically insightful. 
A basic point drawn from the play is that what "happens on the way” to the forum is 
everyday life itself, including the various chaotic, frenetic and indeed comedic 
interactions taking place in a range of social spaces through which one passes on the 
way to the forum.  
 
Richard Lester, director of the film version, captures this in the opening credits of 
the movie by having Psuedolus (played by Zero Mostel) sing "Comedy Tonight!" as a 
means of "setting the stage" and introducing the main characters while using a rapid 
fire collage of scenes and clips as a visual overture to complement the song's 
descriptors.2 The scenes are of people at work and play, individuals gossiping, gambling 
and soliciting, tending to animals or carrying out basic household chores, haggling over 
prices and engaged in arguments over some mundane event or issue. It is clearly a 
                                                             
1 See Sondheim et al., 1963. General information on the presentation of the play is found at the play’s 
Wikipedia listing. 
2 One can find videos of clips from the film’s opening sequence on the internet. E.g., 
https://archive.org/details/AFunnyThingHappenedOnTheWayToTheForum, accessed March 5, 2019. 
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picture of life experienced outside the forum, and yet the streets are filled with the kind 
of interactions that indicate there is a good deal of account-giving and account-taking 
taking place. 
 
It is the various forms of accountability found on the way to the forum that is of 




This paper is part of a long-term project3 to develop an “ethical theory” of 
accountability. The objective is to provide an alternative ontological foundation for the 
study of accountability that focuses on basic relational acts of account-giving as central 
to understanding administrative behavior and decision-making. 
 
The characterization “ethical theory” is intended to differentiate this from the kind 
of “action theory” underpinning most current work on accountability when applied to 
questions of governance. Action theory, in its standard form, regards account-giving 
and other forms of social behavior as voluntarist, purposive and motivated. As 
summarized by James C. Coleman, it is rooted in methodological individualism and 
“grounds social theory in a theory of individual action.”(Coleman, 1986, 1309.) 
 
In contrast, an “ethical theory” of accountability in the sense meant here (and not to 
be mistaken for either “moral theory” or a “theory of ethics”)4 regards account-giving as 
an involuntary, emergent form of problem-solving behavior activated under “ethically 
challenging” conditions (e.g., “ethical dilemmas”).  The argument underlying the theory 
is that the capacity (“ability”) to engage in account-giving/receiving behavior is triggered by the 
human need to deal with problematic conditions involving social interactions where there exists 
a regard and respect for the reaction of others. 
 
Central to this perspective is the basic view initially expressed in my earlier work 
with Barbara Romzek that accountability involves the management of situations 
characterized by “multiple, diverse and often conflicting expectations” (hereafter 
MDCE). (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; Dubnick and Romzek, 1991; Dubnick and 
Romzek, 1993)  The dramatic example of the decision to launch the “Challenger” stands 
out as a tragic case study,  but it also represents one instance among literally thousands 
of dilemma-facing situations where choices (from the significant to the mundane) have 
to be considered and made in the face of MDCE conditions. It is under such conditions 
that the decision-maker(s) have to consider and make choices and thus have to call 
                                                             
3 See   Dubnick, 1998. That chapter was initially presented in Dubnick, 1996. 
4 See Williams, 1985. 
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upon or rely on accountability (in its many forms) as a means for contending with those 
dilemmas. 
 
This perspective on accountability was central to my search for an adequate 
conceptualization and theoretical frame for understanding this elusive subject.5 In the 
process I came to the conclusion that if those of us committed to the study of 
accountability and its role in governance are to take our efforts to the “next level” of 
understanding and comprehension, we need to shift our “ontological” perspective 
(Dubnick, 2014b) and explore radically different approaches to what it means to be 
accountable. 
The unmet need for a theory 
 
As a growing number of scholars turned their attention to issues of accountability 
during the 1980s and 1990s, it became evident that the research required greater 
attention to theory development. For some, the problem with existing “theories” was an 
inability to transform research insights into useful reforms and policies: “existing 
frameworks for analyzing public accountability,” argued John Uhr in 1992, “are 
responsible for much of our inability to contribute to more effective institutions of 
public policy.” (Uhr, 1992, 18.) For others, the proliferating frameworks failed to 
provide the conceptual clarity needed to deal with and “ever-expanding” 
subject.(Mulgan, 2000)  Richard Mulgan highlighted the problem in 2003 book on 
“Holding Power to Account”:  
…the concept itself remains unclear and contested. What is the meaning of 
‘accountability’ and how does it differ from related terms such as ‘responsibility’, 
‘control’ and ‘responsiveness’? Beyond questions of definition, lie disputed 
issues of institutional design. Is institutional accountability best achieved 
through centralised concentration of control or through dispersed power and 
delegated responsibilities? Does external scrutiny militate against professional 
trust and efficiency among the staff of an organisation? Do individual members 
of staff have accountability obligations that conflict with those of their 
organisations? On all such questions, linguistic and practical, the experts 
disagree.(Mulgan, 2003, 8.) 
Despite the acknowledged need for a theory of accountability and/or accountable 
governance, with few exceptions those engaged in accountability studies continued to 
rely on traditional (mostly institutional, e.g., ministerial responsibility, checks and 
balances) framings or typology-driven analyses (e.g., Deleon, 1998, Koppell, 2005) as 
they expanded and extended their research efforts into two areas: the accountability of 
conduct (AC) and the conduct of accountability (CA).  
 
                                                             
5 See my assessment of accountability as a cultural phenomenon in Dubnick, 2014a. 
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The AC/CA approaches are quite distinct on the surface. The AC group looks to the 
use of excuses, rationalizations and other means by individuals who face situations 
where errors or perceived failure have rendered them accountable to some other 
individual or group.6 Theirs is an empirical endeavor concerned with describing and/or 
explaining a common human behavior. When they consider an instance of 
accountability in government, it is regarded as merely as just another case of a generic 
account-giving action. While the distinctive governmental setting has an impact, it is 
not the focus of attention; the floor of the legislature might as well be the factory floor or 
the crowded elevator. What is important is how and why individuals account for their 
(typically erroneous) behavior to others. 
 
The CA group, in contrast, tends to be more institutional in its focus and normative 
in its purpose. Their focus tends to be on the structures and procedures through which 
account-giving is managed and achieved, and they typically regard the context (i.e., 
governmental or private, legislative or executive) as a crucial variable. As a subset of 
that general group, students of bureaucracy and public administration have engaged in 
debates over the relative value of different forms of accountability (e.g., the Friedrich-
Finer debate), oftentimes giving more attention to the normative than the empirical 
endeavor.7 
 
While each of these approaches has generated a rich and diverse literature on a 
variety of topics and perspectives associated with accountability (e.g., performance, 
restorative justice, democratic deficits, etc.), little progress has been made in creating the 
conceptual and explanatory framing that a theory of accountability could provide. The 
purpose and benefit of such an accountability-focused theory would be (1) to help us 
make sense and integrate the growing body of knowledge generated over the past 
three-plus decades, while (2) providing the foundations for enhancing our 
understanding of the subject.8 
Existing “theoretical frames” 
 
Of course, some would argue that the problem is not the lack of a theory of 
accountability, but rather the existence of too many theories.9 However, this represents a 
misunderstanding of what a credible and useful theory of accountability would entail. 
In lieu of efforts to develop a relevant and focused theory of accountability, a 
considerable amount of energy and effort has been devoted to applying a wide range of 
alternative theoretical frames and models to the subject of accountability — but at a 
conceptual cost. Each of the applied framings has reconceptualized accountability to 
                                                             
6 For example, see McLaughlin et al., 1992. 
7 However, see Gruber, 1987. 
8 On the nature and functions of theories, see Kaplan, 1964, chapter 7.  
9 Consider, for example, the coverage of theoretical approaches to accountability in Bovens et al., 2014. 
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suit the requirements of their respective schemes. 
 
For example, studies that deal with accountability through the application of 
principal-agent models stress a mechanistic view of accountability – that is, that 
accountability involves various arrangements aimed at dealing with the problematics of 
getting agents to comply with the preferences of their principals (see Gailmard, 2014; 
Broadbent et al., 1996). Others treat accountability as institutionalized arrangements 
and practices (e.g., checks and balances, ministerial responsibility) for assuring that 
expectations for legitimate governing are being fulfilled (Stone, 1995; Harlow, 2014) and 
rely on a range of "institutional theories" and models to explain their emergence and 
development over time (see Zucker, 1987). Still another theoretical perspective views 
accountability as a particular form of behavior (typically "answerability") that can be 
explained using theoretical lenses borrowed from social psychology and cultural 
studies (see Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). A governance view focuses on the basic role that 
accountability plays in the emergent relational patterns of interaction that develop 
between (and among) those faced with collective action problems. (Peters, 2011; Van 
Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004; Ostrom, 1990). 
 
One can hardly argue with the value and quality of the research and insights 
generated by these and other studies of accountability, but upon close examination 
many studies seem to be dealing with different versions and visions of accountability. 
We have yet to meet the challenge articulated by Uhr and Mulgan. 
The Primacy of the Forum in Accountability Studies. 
 
As noted at the outset of this paper, my primary purpose here is to make the case for 
developing a firm theoretical foundation to take accountability studies to the next level. 
And yet attention needs to be drawn to the research scheme that stands out as an 
example of just how far we as a field can go without making a commitment to an 
ontological shift to an “ethical” (or similar) theory of accountability.10 
 
The Forum Model developed by Mark Bovens and his Utrecht colleagues has 
emerged as a major (if not the dominant) framework for the study of accountability. 
With roots in Bovens’  “The Quest for Responsibility” (Bovens, 1998), the Forum 
construct became the basis for a research scheme (conducted over four years) centered 
at Utrecht University developed to study the “patterns and practices of accountability 
in European governance.”  As summarized in the 2010 capstone publication, the project 
was sharply focused on accountable governance arrangements in key EU institutions  
It assesses to what extent and how the people who populate the key arenas 
where European public policy is made or implemented are held accountable. 
                                                             
10 For an elaboration and critique of the Forum Model, see O'Kelly and Dubnick, 2014. 
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Using a systematic analytical framework, it not only examines the formal 
accountability arrangements but also describes and compares how these operate 
in practice. In doing so, it provides a unique, empirically grounded contribution 
to the pivotal but often remarkably fact-free debate about democracy and 
accountability in European governance. (Bovens et al., 2010, 6.) 
As is the case with other such endeavors, the Utrecht group faced a key conceptual 
hurdle before embarking on the project: how to define accountability without getting 
stuck in the field’s conceptual (and theoretical) quagmires. Adopting what Bovens 
termed a “parsimonious analytical framework,” the project assumed a "narrow 
definition" of accountability as "a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the 
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions 
and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences" (Bovens, 2007, 450 ; emphasis in 
original). The elaboration of the model involved seven characteristics of the what would 
constitute an accountability relationship: 
A relationship qualifies as a case of accountability when:  
1. there is a relationship between an actor and a forum  
2. in which the actor is obliged  
3. to explain and justify  
4. his conduct;  
5. the forum can pose questions;  
6. pass judgement;  
7. and the actor may face consequences. (Bovens, 2007, Box 1.) 
The simple and spare construction of the Forum Model served the purposes of the 
Utrecht study and has been extended (see especially Brandsma and Schillemans, 2013) 
and applied in various ways by many in the field.11  There is little doubt that the Forum 
Model has established itself as the principal perspective for the study of accountability. 
In short, what passes for the current theory of accountability is a self-described 
“parsimonious analytical framework” designed to actually avoid the challenge of 
dealing with the conceptual and theoretical problems plaguing accountability studies. 
Something familiar, something peculiar... 
 
Finally, let us return to the metaphorical theme of this paper and consider what we 
might learn about accountability “on the way to the Forum” that might prove useful for 
developing the “ethical theory” perspective. 
 
What we witness in the everyday social interactions of life outside the Forum can be 
regarded as variations on what the model posits is taking place in the forum as an 
                                                             
11 For example, a recent (March 1, 2019) Google Scholar search for articles published in 2019 referencing the 
“accountability forum” model generated: Landwehr and Wood, 2019; Lee et al., 2019; Park and Lee, 2019; Hansen 
et al., 2019; Schillemans and Bovens, 2019; Hupe, 2019; Dawson et al., 2019; Krick and Holst, 2019— and the list 
continues to expand. 
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actor/agent/individual is called upon and expected to offer an account of some act or 
behavior that has been attributed to her. If this was the case, then each exchange and 
interaction we see outside the forum should, to some extent, resemble a juridical 
relationship between an account giver and the account demanding members of the 
forum.  It would involve viewing all forms of accountability through the lens of action 
theory presumptions. 
 
Shifting perspectives, it is clear that many — if not most — of the interactions we are 
witnessing on the road to the Forum involve account-giving and account-receiving 
behaviors that do not necessarily fit the standard assumptions set by methodological 
individualism. What we witness is haggling over prices in the marketplace, solicitation, 
individuals engaged in an argument over some family issue, participating in a game of 
chance, or even inadvertently stepping on a stranger’s toes while rushing to an 
appointment at the Forum.  Each of these interactions, whether between two 
individuals or among groups of individuals, reflect the existence of relationships rooted 
in the capacity of each individual to give (and receive) an account of their own (and the 
other’s) behavior. Accountability, in short, can be regarded as an inherent characteristic 
of human interactions at their most basic levels. This is the fundamental world view 
that would inform the ethical theory of accountability. 
 
Also uncovered on the road to the Forum are a number of relevant but overlooked 
theories that deal with the kind of accountability manifest in everyday interactions. 
Each of these can offer an intellectual opening to the development of the ethical theory.  
 
1. Adam Smith and the Second-Personal Standpoint 
 
Adam Smith, the iconic “founder” of economics who is often mythologized as the 
intellectual father of capitalism, can also lay claim to another title: the first theorist of 
accountability. It is important to note that Smith’s use of the concept occurs within a 
decade of what the Oxford English Dictionary notes as the first recorded use of the 
word in 1750.12 Specifically, in his first edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS 
1759), Smith uses accountability as a characteristic of a “moral being”, which today 
could be read as “social being”: 
A moral being is an accountable being. An accountable being, as the word expresses, is a 
being that must give an account of its actions to some other, and that consequently must 
regulate them according to the good–liking of this other. Man is accountable to God 
and his fellow creatures. But tho’ he is, no doubt, principally accountable to God, 
in the order of time, he must necessarily conceive himself as accountable to his 
fellow creatures, before he can form any idea of the Deity, or of the rules by 
which that Divine Being will judge of his conduct. A child surely conceives itself 
                                                             
12 See (OED], 2011. A distinction should be made between the etymology of the word and the historical 
emergence of the concept as a practice of governing. See Dubnick, 1998. 
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as accountable to its parents, and is elevated or cast down by the thought of their 
merited approbation or disapprobation, long before it forms any idea of its 
accountableness to the Deity, or of the rules by which that Divine Being will 
judge of its conduct. (Smith, 1759, Part III, ch. 1. ; emphasis added) 
What is “peculiar” about this aspect of Smith’s work is that despite slight 
modifications of the wording over the next four editions of TMS,13 any mention of 
accountability is edited out of the sixth and final edition issued just before his death in 
1790.14 Thus, the role of accountability in Smith’s “moral theory” was lost for decades 
since most readers relied on that final edition as the definitive version of TMS.  It was 
only when scholars based at the University of Glasgow issued the definitive edition of 
TMS15 covering all variations among the six editions that this particular aspect of his 
work drew scholarly scrutiny. 
 
Typically regarded for decades  as a secondary figure in moral, ethical and social 
thought who worked in the shadow of Hume, a close reading revealed that in TMS 
Smith had laid the foundations for a distinctive perspective that Stephen Darwall has 
elaborated as the “second-personal standpoint”.(Darwall, 2006)  Essentially, the second-
personal standpoint abandons the primacy of both individualism (the first-personal 
standpoint) and the existence of some higher authority (the third-personal standpoint) 
as the basis for what he term “mutual accountability” — an accountability based on 
mutual respect and regard for the legitimacy and standing of the Other. 
 
As Darwall’s explication of the “standpoint” demonstrates, this second-personal 
view is neither new nor unique. Judith Butler, for example, relying on the work of 
Levinas and others, has explored how account-giving to the Other reflects one’s 
development as a subjective self.(Butler, 2001; Butler, 2005)  Much of this work— from 
Smith to Darwall and Butler -- would be foundational for an ethical theory of 
accountability. 
 
2. Ethnomethodology and the Legacy of Harold Garfinkel 
 
Although constructing an “ethical theory” would be regarded as antithetical to the 
work of ethnomethodologists (who often regard themselves as committed anti-
theorists), accountability plays a major role in how they conduct and analyzed their 
research. For Harold Garfinkel,16 accountability is not a relationship involving account-
giving and account-receiving. Rather, it is a constitutive feature of social interaction, a 
heuristic device — often in the form of rules, narratives or shared understandings — 
                                                             
13 Initially as a response to a criticism level by his friend David Hume, who suggested he avoid the link to God. 
On Hume’s influence on Smith — and vice versa — see Rasmussen, 2017. 
14 For an elaboration and study of these points, see Dubnick, 2010. 
15 See Smith, 1976, and the Liberty Fund online version at Smith, 1982. 
16 See Garfinkel, 1967; Garfinkel, 1988. Also Rawls, 2008. 
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developed reflexively among those engaged in place and overtime that helps 
participants to make sense and establish (and maintain) an adaptive order. For 
ethnomethodologists the problem of social order is solve by  
how people organize social actions so that others can make sense of them, so that 
each person involved in an interaction can identify the actions being performed 
by the others - and thus comprehend the relationship of the actions to the 
complex of activity under whose auspices they are done, and whose 
implementation they comprise. The design of social actions so that others can 
make sense of them is an indispensable feature of social action, for unless it is 
possible for people to recognize 'ordinary social facts', they would not be capable 
of mutually adjusting their conduct with respect to one another in commonplace 
setting. 
 
Garfinkel's notion of 'accountability' does not, however, involve a relationship 
between two objects — an action, and the account of the action — but refers 
instead to the ways in which actions are organized: that is, put together as 
publicly observable, reportable occurrences. They are not only done, they are 
done so that they can be seen to have been done. The study of 'accountability' 
therefore focuses upon the way actions are done so as to make themselves 
identifiable within the social setting. (Button and Sharrock, 1998, 74.) 
Viewed in this light, accountability is regarded as a vehicle through which 
individuals deal with the challenges of making sense of (and orienting) their 
interactions with others in specific settings. The settings generating the accountable 
order are perceived as “expectancies” — that is, situations similar to MDCE conditions. 
Thus, despite is obscurities and peculiarities, ethnomethodology offers a source of 
material and logic for an ethical theory to work with. 
 
3. Rereading Chester Barnard 
 
Another component of any ethical theory of accountability relates to issues of how 
accountability emerges within given contexts and what forms it assumes. The key 
concept here would involve “accountability spaces” — that is, social spaces where 
accountability relationships take root and develop. Again, there is a relevant literature 
to be mined for purposes of theory building.  
 
For example, in a reexamination of the work of Chester Barnard, Jonathan Justice 
and I explored what we termed “Barnard’s Regret”(Dubnick and Justice, 2014) — that 
is, his views on “business morality and responsibility” articulated in a lecture delivered 
two decades after the appearance of Functions of the Executive. Barnard believed that 
he did not effectively and clearly address these topics in Functions, treating moral and 
ethical problems as “technical issues” and something to be handled by organization 
executives who were assumed to possess both  an understanding or what is best for the 
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organization and the authority to imposed the appropriate moral and ethical order. 
When he did revisit issues related to the moral milieu of organizations twenty years 
later, Barnard concluded that his original approach was a prescription for failure.  What 
emerged from his reflections on morality and responsibility was an acceptance of the 
need to allow considerably more autonomy for those who engage in the cooperative 
endeavors that are at the heart of organizations.  
 
Our rereading of Barnard led to a model that focuses on the creation and design of 
accountability spaces (labelled “zones of expectations”) within which accountable 
relationships can emerge. If an ethical theory is to prove useful, it must deal with the 
spatial factors — that is, the contexts and settings within which accountable relations 
emerge, develop and can be (re)designed. Revisiting Barnard has proven useful in that 
regard, and the vast literature on organizations need to be explored for whatever 
insights they can provide for the construction of the ethical theory. 
 
4. Other avenues to explore 
 
In addition to the work on the second-personal standpoint, ethnomethodology and 
organization theory discussed above, there are at least two other fields where issues 
related to accountability and accountable relationships has taken hold.  
 
In anthropology, the study of morality has been reemerged in recent years with new 
approaches and insights that related to what it means to apply an ethical theory as well 
as the ethnographic studies of the role accountability, responsibility and moral 
obligation plays in shaping social behavior.17 
 
Issues of accountability are also playing a major role in the fields of information 
technology and artificial intelligence. Beyond the efforts to integrate accountability into 
a wide range of algorithms, discussions about what it means to be accountable have 
bordered on the philosophical — and raised a number of extremely interesting and 
challenging issues in the process.18 
Conclusion 
 
This paper was intended to restate the case for the development of an “ethical theory” 
of accountability as an alternative to current theoretical frames being applied by students 
of accountable governance. I would emphasize the word “alternative” at this juncture, 
noting that an ethical theory should not be regarded as replacement for current models; 
rather it is offered as a reframing of accountability that can provide a significantly 
different perspective -- one rooted in (and built upon) ontologically distinct 
presuppositions about the nature of account-giving/receiving. 
                                                             
17 For example, see Faubion, 2014; Laidlaw, 2014; Keane, 2016. 
18 For example, Rosenblat et al., 2014; Crawford, 2016; Neyland, 2016; Lepri et al., 2018. 
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As noted above, central to the effort is establishing accountability as the capacity to 
engage in account-giving/receiving behavior triggered by the human need to deal with 
problematic conditions involving social interactions where there exists a regard and respect for 
the reaction of others.  This reconceptualization of accountability represents a major 
ontological shift and is supported by both the move to a second-person standpoint and 
acceptance of the Strawsonian view that ethical behavior is grounded in reactive 
attitudes inherent in interpersonal activity.  As the previous section indicates, the basic 
elements of an ethical theory reframing of accountability are in place and need to be 
explicated and extended.  Our objective should be to broaden and deepen our 
understanding of accountability, providing opportunities to integrate insights from 
ethnomethodological (sociological) and cultural (anthropological) studies and theories 
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